Abstract Created in 2010 and made operational in 2015, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) is expected to become the main mechanism for transferring public and some private funds to non-Annex I countries to address climate change. It aims to achieve a 50:50 balance between adaptation and mitigation financing over time. While there is a diplomatic history leading to this arrangement, we argue the GCF's allocation strategy requires further refinement if it is to adequately address climate change. We advocate prioritizing climate mitigation over adaptation in funding while not ignoring climate justice concerns all together. We recommend a more targeted approach to its funding allocations based upon the GHGs abatement potential for mitigation or climate vulnerability for adaptation of very specific non-Annex I countries. We believe these refinements will help to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of scarce climate change financing resources required to achieve the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) central objective of no more than 1.5°C by 2100, which requires emissions reductions between 70 and 95% (2010 levels) by 2050.
committed, as well, to designate at least 50% of the adaptation funding to the world's most vulnerable countries (GCF 2016a) .
The GCF board has identified six investment criteria: The impact potential for mitigation and/or adaptation, paradigm shift potential, sustainable development potential, needs of recipient, country ownership, financial efficiency and effectiveness (GCF 2015a) . Nonetheless, it has not defined more specific approaches for allocating funds among non-Annex I countries. A non-binding COP 21 Paris agreement, scarce resources, uncertain immediate participation by the US government under a Trump Administration, and other current realities indicate that there is a lack of capacity and time to adequately pursuit a concurrent 50:50 strategy during its initial stage. We believe that further specifications are needed to improve the efficiency of the GCF strategy.
In this essay, we argue for greater refinement in the GCF's 50:50 mitigation-adaptation allocation framework that builds upon the GCF's investment criteria noted above. We build our case upon four key insights that indicate that the GCF can and must become a real game-changer for climate finance in non-Annex I countries. These insights make us believe that a more targeted financing strategy for both mitigation and adaptation among non-Annex 1 countries could not only be successful, but would be essential in achieving climate stability as a global public good.
Our focus is only on non-Annex I countries that are eligible as recipients of the GCF's funds. These countries are separate from self-funded Annex I and II countries (i.e., economically developed markets), which will need to contribute significantly to their own reductions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions as well as capitalizing the GCF. To be direct, we believe, with some exceptions, the GCF should prioritize mitigation over adaptation for countries with the greater GHG abatement potential over those that have little. This would prioritize climate change financing for mitigation until such targets are increasingly met. Once met, more funding could be invested in adaptation, eventually achieving the 50:50 ratio over time. At the same time, more limited adaptation funds should be targeted to those countries that are most vulnerable to a changing climate and that otherwise can only make negligible contributions to GHG emissions levels, such as the Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
We have organized our essay as follows. We first briefly review current climate financing needs and realities and discuss the GCF's role in supporting low-emissions development pathways in non-Annex I countries (Section 2). Then, we present in greater detail, four rationales supporting our case for refining the GCF's current B50:50^mitigation/adaptation approach (Section 3). We then propose a revised allocation approach that places mitigation finance as a top priority during the early stages of the GCF for those non-Annex I countries that can make considerable contributions to GHG emissions reductions (Section 4). Finally, we discuss the implications of this approach and present our conclusions.
2 The GCF's role in supporting low-carbon development in poor and emerging economies Climate finance is essential for supporting energy-system transformation, reducing emissions, and building climate-resilience. While total climate finance is on the rise, there remains still a large gap between mitigation and adaptation needs and current level of investments (Buchner et al. 2015) . Although better assessments of non-Annex I countries' mitigation and adaptation needs are needed, the costs of meeting mitigation and adaptation needs have been estimated to ascend to US$176 billion/year and US$100 billion/year, respectively, by 2030, and some fear this is a vast underestimate of the need (Peskett et al. 2009; Flåm and Skjaerseth 2009; Chambwera et al. 2014) . At the same time, out of the total global financial flows from all sources that address climate change, which jumps to US$343 to 385 billion/year (IPCC 2014a, p. 110), a gross estimate of US$80 billion/year is targeted to poor and emerging economies. Purely private finance flows to poor and emerging economies have been in the range of US$10 to US$72 billion/year (over the period [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] and public finance flows to these economies are estimated at US$35 to US$49 billion/year (over the period [2011] [2012] (IPCC 2014a, p. 126) . The majority of both public and private flows (94%) have gone to mitigation (Buchner et al. 2013, p. 10 ), yet studies have shown that we are still lacking sufficient resources to achieve decarbonization in developing economies (IEA 2016) . Thus, the international community is currently lagging behind its promise to direct funds to aid non-Annex I countries to achieve low-emissions development pathways and build climate-resilience (GCF 2016a).
As a result, the GCF is at a starting point for changing the current levels of climate finance investment in poor and emerging economies. Although the GCF remains far behind its promise to mobilize US$100 billion/year by 2020, it is expected to become the main source of climate finance for non-Annex I. As of December 2016, the Fund has raised US$10.3 billion in pledges from 43 national governments to support mitigation and adaptation projects (GCF 2016b) , and has announced its first eight investments (GCF 2015b). Countries will be able to access the funds directly through a national designated authority (NDA) that will mobilize accredited national or multilateral implementing entities (IEs) (e.g., multilateral or bilateral organizations, NGOs, government agencies, private sector) to develop projects. Most importantly, the GCF is different from previous financial mechanisms as it enhances direct access for recipient countries and seeks to include the private sector. The GCF can attract the private sector by reducing the costs and risks of climate investments that may not considered commercially viable without its intervention (e.g., buying-down upfront costs of projects that are considered excessively risky) (GCF 2016c). It is thus important to note the GCF will not only deliver funds raised from public, private, and philanthropic sources to developing countries, it will also serve as a track record that would enhance confidence in climate investments (Buchner et al. 2015) .
The GCF's current 50:50 mitigation/adaptation allocation framework reflects a political victory for non-Annex I countries that have fought to position adaptation as a priority in UNFCCC negotiations (Ciplet et al. 2013) . After years of fruitless negotiations for a mitigation regime and rising numbers of natural disasters , many developing countries have organized to push for further support toward adaptation actions. This strategy follows an understandable diplomatic rationale given the significant inequalities with the problem's creation and impacts, and the perceived differences in the costs and benefits of adaptation and mitigation efforts themselves. Mitigation provides a global public good with its benefits dispersed globally and experienced over long-time scales, while adaptation provides local benefits over a shorter time span (Watkiss et al. 2015) . It is thus not surprising that mitigation-a strategy that reduces fossil fuel-based growth-is perceived as having higher political opportunity costs, making adaptation more attractive to developing and emerging economies (Kane and Shogren 2000) . While acknowledging that the GCF should prioritize the adaptation needs of the most vulnerable countries, we believe that the resulting 50:50 mitigation/adaption allocation framework for the GCF needs further refinement. The current B50:50^approach serves fairness but overlooks the GCF's potential to become a key player in climate finance and aid recipient countries to meet global climate needs.
In the next section, we present four arguments that show opportunity for a more targeted approach that will leverage the GCF funds to invest in mitigation actions in developing countries with abatement potential, while prioritizing adaptation funding in the most vulnerable countries that cannot contribute significantly to emissions reductions.
3 The case for refining a B50:50^mitigation/adaptation approach Firstly, rising emissions require urgent global climate action. While the GCF's financial resources are small compared to the estimated costs of achieving climate goals aforementioned, they are still needed and can make a difference in developing regions. The IPCC's Synthesis Report demonstrates that recent anthropogenic emissions of GHGs are Bthe highest in history^(IPCC 2014a p. 2). Total GHGs emissions Bhave continued to increase from 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases between 2000 and 2010^(IPCC 2014a, p. 5) mainly due to fossil fuel-based economic growth. Studies have also shown that as we continued to delay additional mitigation actions, we increase the likelihood of reaching biophysical Btipping-points^(critical thresholds beyond which a system reorganizes and does not return to the initial state), surpass adaptation limits (point at which adaptive actions to avoid intolerable risk for an actor's objectives are not available), reduce our options for building climate-resilient pathways, and increase the costs of mitigation actions (IPCC 2014a). While both adaptation and mitigation responses are needed (IPCC 2014a; Millner and Dietz 2014) , the IPCC has clearly stated that prospects for effective adaptation and climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development ultimately Bdepend on what the world accomplishes with climate change mitigation (high confidence)^(2014a, p. 90).
As the UNFCCC's operating entity, the GCF can promote additional mitigation efforts by prioritizing mitigation finance in countries with greater abatement potential. For example, the GCF could channel mitigation funds to developing and emerging economies with growing energy-supply needs and where many still lack access to modern energy. Despite there has been some progress in the energy sector (i.e., investment in clean energy increased, while investments in oil and gas decreased in 2015 compared to previous years) (IEA 2016) and many countries are shifting to renewable energy and nuclear power, an estimated of 1.2 billion people (17% of the global population) do not have access to electricity (IEA 2016) . The GCF can intervene here by maximizing mitigation opportunities for countries with rising GHG emissions. Such targeted intervention would bring both global and local benefits.
Secondly, the GCF could take advantage of the favorable conditions created by non-Annex I countries that are already taking on more ambitious domestic mitigation actions. Recent research has shown that some non-Annex I countries (e.g., South Africa and Indonesia) have proactively engaged in mitigation actions against the interest of powerful lobbies (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015, p. 505) . At the same time, other non-Annex I countries (e.g., Gulf Cooperation Council, China) that have historically not made significant attempts to provide mitigation contributions under the UNFCCC framework (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015) have recently taken international commitments at COP 21 and others have made commitments that do not depend upon external financial support (e.g., China) (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015) . The GCF could ride the wave of these Bfirst independent movers^ (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015) and support added mitigation actions in countries with abatement potential.
Thirdly, it is important to note that there is a large potential for cost-effective mitigation investments in REDD+ and other actions to reduce emissions from deforestation in poor and emerging economies that could be leveraged by the GCF. Although it is difficult to estimate the aggregate costs of REDD+ activities needed in non-Annex I countries-as the costs can differ substantially between and within countries (Pagiola and Bosquet 2009) , reducing emissions from forest degradation and agriculture in these countries would significantly benefit the global community. The IPCC estimates that deforestation, forest degradation, and agricultural emissions account for about a quarter of total GHG emissions annually (IPCC 2014b, p. 26) . To date, only about US$6 billion have been directed toward REDD+ actions between 2009 and 2016 throughout Latin American, African, and Asian Pacific countries (Wolosin et al. 2016, p. 3) . REDD+ investments seem to have been targeting areas facing acute deforestation pressures (e.g., Ethiopia, Mexico, and Ghana) rather than areas with high forest cover (e.g., Indonesia, Tanzania, Brazil, and Colombia). REDD+ finance could be maximized by expanding REDD+ finance to countries with the largest areas of forest cover and by balancing the distribution of funds within countries (Wolosin et al. 2016) . GCF can intervene here by targeting REDD+ finance to other forest countries and geographic areas within these countries where most needed.
Finally, track records of past investments indicate that effective mitigation can be delivered in developing regions but there are still many challenges that need to be addressed in order to make these investments more appealing for the private sector. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has shown that prior to the operationalization of the GCF, multilateral climate financing has been efficiently spent in countries with relatively high GHG emissions. Countries like Mexico and Morocco have been able to significantly scaled-up their efforts to shift toward renewable energy and other clean energy technologies, while countries like Brazil have engaged in REDD+ projects (Nakhooda et al. 2014 ). However, not all mitigation investments have been successful. Many programmes have failed because they were not designed to reflect national circumstances (Nakhooda et al. 2014) . Adaptation finance has also been directed to the most vulnerable countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Niger, SIDS), although adaptation programs and projects seem to face greater challenges. There are institutional, social, cultural, and even psychosocial constraints to delivering adaptation projects with efficiency (Adger et al. 2009; Anguelovski et al. 2014; Klein et al. 2014; Evans et al. 2016) . Given the urgency of staying within a 1.5°C pathway and the more solid track record of mitigation investments in poor and emerging economies, the GCF should intervene by supporting mitigation projects in these countries, making them less risky and even more attractive to private sector investments.
The allocation of GCF's funds based on a more targeted approach
While it is imperative that adaptation funding is provided to those developing countries most vulnerable to rising GHGs emissions, the allocation strategy should not be based on an arbitrary, even split of funding between adaptation and mitigation project investments. We argue that the GCF's commitment to a 50:50 split between mitigation and adaptation investments should be revised and follow a more systematic approach of targeted mitigation actions first and investments in adaptation second, with some exceptions. As noted earlier, successful mitigation reduces the need for significant investments in adaptation. Increased climate stability from successful mitigation increases the opportunity for greater success in future adaptation investments. The rapid rise of climate-related disasters and failure to achieve a binding agreement for a mitigation regime highlight the need to do more to reduce GHG emissions. Brechin (2016) argues that to achieve successful collective action and maintain a stable global climate, the international community must encourage all countries that make meaningful contributions to reduce their GHG production levels. From that realization, we argue that climate finance should fund targeted mitigation actions in those non-Annex I countries with the greatest abatement potential. This would lessen the priority for SIDS and LDCs with smaller economies, as they do not add significantly to global emissions. As Preston, Dow, and Berkhout have noted, we have to take transformative action before transformation is forced upon us (2013, p. 1024) . If the GCF more tightly prioritizes its funding would be an important place to start with this transformative action.
Thus, we proposed a revised general allocation approach that takes advantage of the current GHG emissions reductions potential of non-Annex I countries. Building upon Brechin's (2016) study on the ability of countries to contribute to climate change mitigation, we use 2012 data from the World Resource Institute (WRI) to examine the ability of 143 non-Annex countries to make significant GHG emissions reductions. This includes China, considered a non-Annex I country and thus eligible to apply for the GCF's resources. However, it is unlikely that China would request finance from the GCF's, as it funding its own mitigation measures and has committed to reduce its investment in coal power overseas (Buckley and Sanzillo 2015; Herve-Mignucci and Wang 2015) .
According to the WRI data, non-Annex I countries are responsible for about 63% of the total GHG emissions. Among non-Annex I, there is a group of top emitters that contribute to 44% of global total of GHG emissions, which includes China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Iran, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and South Africa, in rank order. China's emissions alone account for 23% of the total global emissions. When excluding China, each of these countries' GHG emissions ranges from 1 to 6% of the global total emissions. A second group of 78 countries, which includes Malaysia (ranked #11) through Benin (ranked #88), is responsible for another 19% of total GHG emissions. Each of these countries produces from 0.5 to 0.9% of the total global GHG emissions. Finally, a third group of 55 countries, mostly SIDS, LDCs, and African countries, only produces collectively less than 1% of the total global GHG emissions. See Table 1 . Appendix 1 in the supplemental materials provides a complete listing of all non-Annex 1 countries It would be strategic to take advantage of the mitigation potential of the first two groups by targeting climate investments toward mitigation for these non-Annex I countries, related to their collective contributions to climate change. In the case of the third group, it would be less strategic to use scarce GCF funds to finance mitigation projects in these countries. However, preliminary studies suggests that multilateral climate change-designated investments have already flowed into some of these countries for mitigation purposes even though they cannot make a meaningful contribution to the collective climate problem (see Brechin 2016) .
To reduce GHG emission levels sufficiently to address the concerns of climate scientists will require the major contributors to take significant mitigation action immediately. This is required by the world community if it is to reduce GHGs by 40 to 70% by 2050, and to zero by 2100 (IPCC 2014a ). An even more aggressive mitigation action will be needed if the international community aims to achieve a 1.5°C scenario by 2100. This would require emissions reductions from between 70 and 95% (2010 levels) by 2050 (IPCC 2014a, p. 21 ). This makes a global commitment to GHGs mitigation even more urgent in these countries. The GCF should assist these developing countries in the first two groups noted above, to prioritize GHG emission reductions over adaptation.
On the other hand, SIDS, LDCs, and the African states in the third group, which can only make negligible contributions to GHG emissions reduction, should focus more on adaptation and less on mitigation (Brechin 2016) . As the most vulnerable countries to climate change, climate finance in these countries must focus exclusively on building climate-resilience. As a consequence, we are very supportive of GCF's second major promise of delivering at least 50% of the eventual adaption allocation to the most vulnerable countries. Funding here would also be strategic and it should be relative to the risks that each country faces along with their ability to absorb those investments. We believe, however, that remaining adaptation monies would be better used directed toward achieving mitigation results either as stand-alone projects or that combined mitigation and adaptation objectives. These include a wide-ranging set of options, dependent upon country conditions, from promoting energy efficiencies, renewable green energy sources, forest protections, transportation needs, and other appropriate strategies identified by GCF regarding its thoughtful funding matrix, in dialogue with individual countries.
The targeted approach to mitigation and adaptation that we have outlined here is a general allocation framework and not a formulaic approach for raising funds or for disbursing money to non-Annex I countries following the 50:50 mitigation/adaptation framework as past studies have proposed (Cui et al. 2014; Müller 2014) . We have examined the ability of non-Annex I countries to contribution to global GHG emissions reductions but this does not include other indicators of mitigation capacity, such as the level of economic development and the costs of shifting from a fossil fuel to others, that have been proposed by studies assessing global carbon allocation (Ekanaye et al. 2015) , or indexes of physical vulnerability proposed to allocate adaptation funds among poor and emerging economies (Guillaumont 2015) . However, these indicators could be integrated in future assessments.
While this targeted approach may raise equity concerns among non-Annex I countries that have historically rejected any differentiation among them (G77+ China) (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015; Ciplet et al. 2013) , we believe strongly, however, that equity will be best served by reducing future adaptation needs, if emerging economies with rising emissions are allowed to take more aggressive steps in mitigation actions. The more aggressive mitigation efforts recently taken by emerging economies considered Bnon-Annex I^countries challenge the somewhat dated dichotomous differentiation between BAnnex I^(i.e., developed) and BNon-Annex I^(i.e., developing countries and emerging economies) countries. This division, established in 1992 to separate member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), does not reflect current economic nor GHG emission realities (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2015; Pauw et al. 2014; Parikh and Baruah 2012) . Without denying the historical responsibility of Western countries in creating climate change as a global problem, we believe that the GCF can achieve fairness by recognizing the different contributions of non-Annex I countries to global GHG emissions and needs of building climate-resilience.
The recent Paris Accords, emerging from the UNFCCC COP21 meetings, provide a framework from which to build from the bottom up making the efforts more sustainable. The intentional nationally determined contributions, (I)NDCs, sets up potential goals to be tackled but are likely to be insufficient alone to accomplish what is needed (Cassidy 2015; Le Page 2015) . We argue that mitigation goals be enhanced sufficiently and acquire first priority by GCF and other international public and private investments sources.
Conclusion
With this essay, we have presented a targeted approach on how the GCF can support non-Annex 1 countries shift toward low-emission development paths while also addressing the adaptation needs of those most vulnerable. We have argued for greater refinement of a B50:50^balance between mitigation and adaptation funding over time. We encourage the GCF to prioritize mitigation over adaptation, and then again prioritizing those non-Annex 1 countries that can contribute most significantly to GHG emissions reductions. Funding for mitigation projects should receive lower priority in those many countries that cannot make meaningful contributions to GHG reductions. While we promote a mitigation first approach to climate changing funding, we also firmly believe adaptation should be the central focus of those countries most vulnerable to a changing climate. In these cases, financing should go to the non-Annex I countries with the greatest vulnerabilities in ways that can best be utilized by those countries. Once initial mitigation goals are met, countries could progressively shift their focus more fully toward financing additional climate adaptation needs. Through a more targeted collective action, the global community will more likely achieve a Breal paradigm shift toward low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways^ (GCF 2011, p. 2) . The arguments found here require much more development than presented. Still, we hope this essay will spark a new discussion that might lead to an even more strategic international effort to foster greater efficiency and effectiveness in climate change mitigation and reduce climate vulnerabilities for all peoples and nations.
